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INTEGRATION OF LEASED AND UNLEASED INTERESTS
The scope of this paper, notwithstanding its title, is  limited to the area  
of what is  now commonly referred to as "compulsory” or "forced" pooling or 
integration. In view of the fact that the legal problems which are involved in 
that subject include, in one way or the other, a substantial portion of the field  
of oil and gas law, this paper is  further lim ited to a consideration of the present 
Arkansas statutes on compulsory pooling, with some discussion and speculation 
as to the reason for the amendment of the former statutes on that subject. For 
other articles and discussions of compulsory pooling in general and of particular 
aspects thereof, reference is  made to the table of authorities.
Before entering into the discussion of the subject, I believe it will be 
worth while to consider, from an historical viewpoint, certain rules of law and 
principles which evolved over the years in the field of oil and gas, and which 
contributed to the advent of compulsory pooling.
1.
During the period that the law of oil and gas was in its formative state,
it is  now apparent that the courts were ignorant of the nature of oil and gas.
2
Of course, the courts were not alone in their ignorance. One authority in 
discussing the evolution of the law or rule of capture, states:
"The judges knew no more about the true nature of oil 
and gas reservoirs than did the oil operators and geologists of 
the time, so the judges were hard put to decide what was right
or wrong in the case of this strange mineral............. No precedent
being known, they looked for analogies and found them in perco-
lating waters and in game. "
In one of the leading cases announcing what has become known as the "law 
of capture" or the "rule of capture", decided in 1907 by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, an example of the admission by the courts of their lack of knowledge of the 
true nature of oil and gas wells and reservoirs is  found. There the Court states:
"An oil or gas well may draw its product from an indefinite 
distance and in time exhaust a large space. Exact knowledge on 
this subject is  not at present attainable, but the vagrant character 
of the mineral and the porous sand rock in which it is  found and 
through which it moves fully justify the general conclusion we have 
stated above and have led to its general adoption by practical opera-  
tors. The right of every landowner to drill a well on his own land 
at whatever spot he may see fit certainly must be conceded. If, 
then, the landowner drills on his land at such spot as best sub-
serves his purpose, what is  the standing of the adjoining landowner 
whose oil or gas may be drained by the well ? He certainly ought 
not to be allowed to stop his neighbor from developing his own farm.
There is  no certain way of ascertaining how much of the oil and gas 
that comes out of the well was when in situs under this farm and how 
much under that. What, then, has been held to be the law? It is  this,
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as we understand it, every landowner or his lessee  may locate his wells 
wherever he p leases, regardless of the interests of others. He may d is-
tribute them over the whole farm or locate them only on one part of it.
He may crowd the adjoining farms so as to enable him to draw the oil and 
gas from them. What, then, can the neighbors do? Nothing; only go and 
do likewise. He must protect his own oil and gas. He knows it is  wild 
and will run away if it finds an opening and it is  his business to keep it 
at home. This may not be the best rule; but neither the Legislature nor 
our highest Court has given us any better. No doubt many thousands of 
dollars have been expended 'in protecting lines’ in oil and gas territory  
that would not have been expended if som e rule had existed by which it 
could have been avoided. " 3
The rule of capture has been more distinctly defined by the Supreme Court 
of Texas as follows:
That rule simply is that the owner of a tract of land acquires title  
to the oil or gas which he produces from wells on his land, though part 
of the oil or gas may have migrated from adjoining lands. He may thus 
appropriate the oil and gas that have flowed from adjacent lands without 
the consent of the owner of those lands, and without incurring liability to 
him for drainage. " 4
Under the rule of capture, as exemplified by the above cases, in the absence 
of any kind of regulation or of any agreement among all the producers and royalty owners 
in a pool, it is obvious that, once a pool was discovered, a competitive race to drill 
wells and produce the oil and gas was a practical necessity, for the owner who delayed 
in drilling, or who failed to get as much production from his w ells as his neighbors 
produced from their w ells, would lose oil by drainage to the adjacent properties.
Each w ell was drilled and exhausted as rapidly as was physically possible in the 
effort by each producer to get his oil and gas to the surface and reduced to possession . 
Under these circumstances waste was inevitable.
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As sufficient technological understanding of the behavior of oil and gas 
pools was developed, it became apparent that one of the fundamental causes of 
waste was unrestricted production, but it was equally as apparent that because 
of the multiplicity of ownership in m ost oil and gas fields and the resultant conflicts 
of interest, efforts of individual producers alone could not effectively prevent waste.
Thus it was from necessity that a system  of law evolved under which oil and gas 
could be produced in a relatively efficient manner and under which a better method 
than unrestricted drilling and production would be devised to protect property rights.
It was during this same period of tim e that the conservation movement in the 
United States was gaining momentum. One of the conservation devices which evolved 
is the restriction on the drilling of w ells, since it is  partly through the location of wells 
that fluid movements within a reservoir are controlled, and since the cost of drilling 
and equipping the wells is  usually the m ost substantial part of the total cost of developing 
a pool, the number of w ells drilled directly affects the economics of the operation. 5 
One of the ways that a restriction of drilling can be accomplished is  through the outright 
limitation of the right to drill, which takes the form of the specification of the minimum 
acreage on which a well w ill be permitted, such as one oil w ell on each 40-acre tract, 
or one gas well on each 640-acre tract. However, difficulty is  presented when the 
minimum acreage for which only one well is  permitted consists of a number of 
separately owned tracts. If the owner of a tract is  not permitted to have a well on 
his tract and thereby a means of participating in the total production from a pool, the 
oil and gas under his tract will be drained. Therefore, it is  necessary that he be given 
an opportunity to recover his share of the oil and gas within the pool. If his tract is
4 .
sm aller than the established minimum size  for a well, and he is  denied the right 
to drill, he is  directly deprived of his property. It is at this point that the topic 
of integration of leased and unleased interests becomes pertinent.
In the case of Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana, 6 decided in 1900 by the Supreme 
Court  of the United States, it was established that the states in the exercise of their 
police powers could place restrictions upon the rule of capture. While that case of 
course had nothing to do with compulsory pooling, it did set the stage for further 
legislative encroachments upon the rule of capture.
Even though the advocates of conservation were becoming more vocal and 
were gaining the attention7 of high authorities of the United States in the early 1920's, 
the fir st restrictive drilling and compulsory pooling enactments were not motivated by 
the prevention of waste but resulted from the nuisance and safety factors caused by 
drilling in incorporated c ities. In 1927 the City of Oxford, Kansas enacted an ordinance 
which prohibited the drilling of more than one well to each city block and provided that 
if the person obtaining the drilling permit for a block did not hold leases on all of the 
lots in such block, the permit would be conditioned so that the drilling party would de-
liver to each owner whose lot was not so leased a proportionate share of l/8 th  of the 
oil, such proportion being on a square foot basis. Provision was also made for issu -
ance of the permit to the party having under lease the largest area in the block and for 
participation as a working interest owner of le ssees  and owners of unleased lots who 
owned the smaller area in the block by the posting of appropriate guarantees for their 
share of costs. This ordinance was the subject of the first case before the courts
5.
which concerned compulsory pooling and was considered first in the Federal D istrict 
Court of Kansas ® in 1928 and then by the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 8th 
Circuit 9 in 1929. The latter Court, in affirming the validity of the ordinance, states:
"But looking to the substance of things, as equity does, what 
are the rights of plaintiffs that w ill be encroached upon or denied to 
them by the enforcement of this ordinance ? It is not the m ere right 
to drill a well on one or two lots at great cost and stop with that, or 
to take the proportionate part of the oil and gas in the pool that might 
be said to lie under or be fairly attributed to those lo ts . The obvious 
purpose was to reach the pool as quickly as possible and take all of the 
oil and gas obtainable before others could get it, thus seriously encroach-
ing upon and probably destroying the same rights of adjoining lot owners.
If one or more lot owners have given a lease for which no permit is 
obtainable their lessee  may join a le ssee  who has a permit in the same 
block on term s that are fair to both lessor  and le ssee . If a lot owner 
has not given a lease  he is  protected by the asking in a fair proportion 
of the mineral produced by a permittee. The regulations make every 
effort to protect, rather than to destroy rights. They extend equal 
opportunity to all who have an interest and eliminate the race between 
those having equal rights in a common source of wealth, so that some 
may not take all and leave others with nothing. "
Subsequently the validity of sim ilar ordinances of other cities was sustained 
by the courts. 10
The States were not far behind in adopting statutes providing for the creation 
of drilling or spacing units and the compulsory pooling of interests therein in the 
absence of agreement. 11 At the present tim e there are some 29 states that have 
some form of compulsory pooling. 12 The most notable exception of states that have 
substantial production with no provision for compulsory pooling are Kansas and Texas.
6.
To digress for a moment from compulsory pooling, for a vivid illustration  
of the inequities resulting from statutes and regulations thereunder which fix spacing 
units permitting only one well to be drilled thereon but at the same time do not provide 
for compulsory pooling of separately owned interests within the spacing unit, it is  not 
necessary to look any farther than our neighboring state of Texas. An illustration of 
this is  the recent case of Hitchcock v. Sojourner Drilling Corporation, 13 decided in 
1962 by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals. In that case the plaintiff executed an oil 
and gas lea se  on 156 acres, including 24 acres which he subsequently conveyed to one 
of the defendants. After the conveyance, oil was discovered and produced from the 24- 
acre tract so conveyed, under a 40-acre spacing rule fixed by the Railroad Commission. 
Plaintiff, as the owner of the other 16 acres in the spacing unit and there being no 
possibility of a well being allowed thereon, contended that he was entitled to 16/40ths 
of the royalty from the w ell on the spacing unit, notwithstanding that it was not located 
on his land, and that the spacing arrangement constituted a forced pooling of p la in tiff's 
16 acres with the 24 acres. The Court, in denying the claim of plaintiff, reaffirmed 
the traditional and long-standing rule o f property that royalties belong to the owner of 
the particular tract upon which the well is  located and that the regulations of the Railroad 
Commission in fixing spacing units cannot effect a change of property rights.
Of course the compulsory pooling statutes met with fierce resistance since the 
methods used and results derived under the statutes differed materially from the 
relatively unfettered rule of capture. Following the enactment of the Oklahoma law 
in 1935 its  validity was first challenged in Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas C o ..1 4
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and the Oklahoma Supreme Court rendered its  decision thereon on March 1, 1938 
sustaining the constitutionality of the law. Except for one case involving a California 
statute which prohibited drilling more than one well to an acre, but which did not 
provide for the participation by the owners of lands upon which no well could be drilled 
under the statutory lim itations, the courts have upheld the validity of compulsory 
pooling laws 16 in every case in which they have been in issue.
The validity of Arkansas laws on compulsory pooling has not been at issu e  in
any reported court decision, although prior to the recent amendment the statute had
been utilized numerous tim es in hearings before the Oil and Gas Commission. As a
matter of fact, it appears that the Court has made reference to the statute in only a few
cases, one of these cases being Poindexter v . Lion Oil Refining C o ., decided by
the Arkansas Supreme Court in 1943, a case involving lease cancellation for failure
to offset and develop, and the defendant apparently contended that it was precluded
from drilling on one of the tracts involved because its lease only covered one-half
of the m inerals. The Court made short work in disposing of that objection, stating:
''This presents no serious difficulty. Our laws provide means whereby 
the entire mineral interest can be leased for the benefit of all concerned.
See.........§ 15 of Act 105 of 1939. No effort has been made to invoke the
benefit of such,laws, "
Again, in Yelvington v . Alston, Trustee, 19 decided in 1944, the Court's dicta 
invited a party to utilize the compulsory pooling laws. This was a rather peculiar 
case which has been cited by some authorities 20 as a rejection by Arkansas of the 
theory of equitable pooling which has been approved by the Courts of M ississippi and 
Louisiana. However, it  is  my opinion that the case did not go that far and the
8 .
question has not yet been determ ined in A rkansas. In that case  a well was 
drilled pursuant to a drilling  perm it and the number of ac re s  covered thereby 
was indicated as twenty. Yelvington owned one-half of the m inerals in seven 
acres in the 20-acre tra c t  but he did not own under the d rill site . The evidence 
showed that the drilling perm it was issued on the basis of 10-acre  spacing and 
Yelvington' s m ineral in te res t was not in the 10 acres  in which the well was located. 
Thus there was no d iverse  ownership of separa te  tra c ts  within the drilling unit 
and the prerequ isite  for pooling, either com pulsory, voluntary or equitable, was 
not presen t. The Court pointed out that when the other 10 -acre  drilling unit was 
drilled it might requ ire  an integration o rder because of the d iverse  ownership, but 
the question was not then before the Court.
Let us now turn  to a discussion of the statutes concerning compulsory 
pooling, with particu la r reference to the old Arkansas statute, since prio r to its  
revision it was the pa tte rn  for a substantial number of statu tes in other sta tes.
By Act 105 of 1939 the Arkansas Legislature enacted a comprehensive 
conservation statute. It is  now codified as  Section 53-101 et seq. of the A rkansas 
Statutes of 1947. The declaration of policy for the Act s ta tes:
"In recognition of past, p resen t and imminent evils occurring 
in the production and use of oil and gas, as a resu lt of waste in the 
production and use thereof in the absence of co-equal o r correlative 
rights of owners of crude oil or natural gas in a common source of 
supply to produce and use the sam e, this law is enacted for the pro-
tection of public and private in te res ts  against such evils by prohibiting 
waste and compelling ratable production. " 22
9.
A broad definition of waste is  provided 23 including the inefficient, excessive  
or improper use or dissipation of reservoir energy; the locating, spacing or producing 
of w ells in a manner which results, or tends to result, in reducing the quantity of oil 
or gas ultimately to be recovered; and abuse of correlative rights due to drainage 
because of nonuniform, disportionate and unratable withdrawals. Waste is prohibited. 24 
The Oil and Gas Commission is vested with general authority to regulate the spacing 
of w ells and to establish drilling units, 25 and in addition the statute specifically provides 
that the Commission shall provide drilling units for each pool, and each drilling unit so 
established shall comprise the maximum area which may be efficiently and economically 
drained by one well. 26 The term "owner" is  defined as the person who has the right to 
drill into and to produce from any pool, and to appropriate the production either for 
him self or for him self and another, or others. 27 Section 5 3 -115A provided for the 
integration of drilling units. That section, before the 1963 amendment, provided to 
the effect that when two or more separately owned tracts of land are embraced within 
an established drilling unit and the owners thereof do not agree to integrate their 
interests, the Commission shall require them to do so and the operator designated 
by the Commission was given the right to charge the other owners for their share 
of costs, and the operator was given the right to receive the production of any non-  
paying owner to secure the payment of such costs.
Over the years since the enactment of that Act, many questions concerning its 
construction and operation have been raised. While none of these questions were  
presented to the Arkansas Supreme Court, som e questions under almost identical 
statutes in other states were answered by the Courts of those states. One of the
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first of these  questions which occurs to a reader of the statute, is just what is  a
separately owned tract of land ? In Smith v. Holt, 28 decided by the Louisiana 
Supreme Court in 1953, the defendant Holt owned a 40-acre tract in fee. In 
October 1939 he sold the east half to plaintiff’s predecessor in title and the west 
half to another party, reserving all minerals in both of the conveyances. There-
after, Holt executed an oil and gas lease covering the entire 40-acre tract, and 
subsequently the Louisiana Conservation Department established the 40-acre tract 
as a drilling unit and a producing well was completed at a location on the west half 
of the drilling unit. Plaintiff brought suit to establish that prescription had 
extinguished the mineral servitude on the east half of the drilling unit since no 
drilling has occurred thereon. One of the contentions of plaintiff was that the order 
creating the spacing unit was not intended to operate as a pooling order but m erely  
laid the foundation for, and must be implemented by, a second order effecting a 
voluntary or forced pooling of each particular unit. The Court held that, under the 
definition of "owner”, that is the person who has the right to drill into and produce 
and to appropriate the production either for him self or for others, defendant Holt’s 
lessee alone could qualify as owner, and since there was only one owner of the 
drilling unit, to require the lessee  to go through the procedure of obtaining a forced 
pooling order would be a vain and useless act, neither favored in law nor contemplated 
by the statute.
Let us now take a slightly different set of facts. Suppose that a 40-acre  
drilling unit has been established and A is  the mineral owner of the east half of 
that forty and B is  the mineral owner under the west half, and by Separate leases
11.
which do not contain pooling clauses, both A and B grant lea ses  to C. Under the
authority of Smith v. Holt, forced pooling is  not perm issible since there is only 
one owner under the statutory definition. But what are the rights of A or B if  
the only w ell which is permitted to be drilled is drilled on the west half of the 
drilling unit which is subject to a lease from B? Under the rule of capture B would 
be entitled to receive all royalties from the unit well and A would get nothing. In 
addition, no drilling could be done on the tract of A since only one well may be drilled 
on each drilling unit. Louisiana and M ississippi 29 have applied what is  now commonly 
re fe rre d  to as "equitable pooling" to this situtation, in holding that the effect of the 
drilling under those circum stances was the unitizing of the drilling unit to the end 
that a ll royalty owners therein share the royalty from the oil and gas produced from 
the w ell thereon, with the decisions being based on equity and not on the provisions 
of the compulsory pooling statutes. Myers, The Law of Pooling and Unitization, indicates 
however, that the weight of authority is to the contrary.
While still considering the question of what is a separately owned tract of 
land, let us change our assumption and assum e that in our hypothetical 40-acre drilling 
unit, Mr. A is the mineral owner of an undivided one-half interest in the entire forty 
which he leases to C, and Mr. B is the mineral owner of the remaining undivided one- 
half interest which he leases to D. Under those circum stances, are there separately 
owned tracts of land to which the compulsory pooling statute may be applied? That 
question was presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Denver Producing and 
Refining Co. v. Meeker, decided in 1947 and the Court answered in the negative, 
holding that the lessees  were tenants in common and not the separate owners of two
12,
or m ore separate tracts embraced within a spacing or drilling unit. The Oklahoma 
s ta tu tes have been amended to provide for the compulsory pooling of undivided
in te re s ts . 32
Other questions occur but have not been presented for a judicial determination. 
For instance, if  a drilling unit has not been created when the well is  drilled, could 
the Commission thereafter require that other "Owners" who did not participate in 
such d rillin g  and who are compelled to pool their interests, pay a portion of the 
d rilling  costs ? This question would be pertinent each tim e that a wildcat well is  
d rilled , since the authority of the Oil and Gas Commission is  to establish units 
consisting  of the maximum area that can be efficiently and economically drained by 
one w ell, 33 and of course that cannot be determined until the well is  drilled. I raise  
this question because the statute provided that in the event integration was required, 
the operator designated by the Commission to develop and operate the unit shall have 
the rig h t to charge each other interested owner the actual expenditures required for 
such purposes. Of course, in the question presented, the development had already 
o ccu rred  and the Commission would appear to be limited to designating the operator 
for production purposes, and the right of the operator to make expenditures to be 
borne by the forced pooled owners would be expenditures for operation.
The statute also provided that the designated operator shall have the right to 
receive  the first production which otherwise would be delivered or paid to "the other 
p a rtie s  jointly interested in the drilling of the w e ll," so that the amount due by each 
of them  for his share of the expenses of drilling, equipping and operation of the well
13.
may be paid to the operator out of production. I would assum e that the reference 
to "the other parties jointly interested in the drilling of the well" actually meant 
"forced pooled owners" and of course they may or may not have been "jointly inter-
ested in the drilling of the well. " I believe i f  the compulsory pooling order was 
issued prior to the drilling of the well, the "forced pooled owners" would be "jointly 
interested" parties, but if  the well was already drilled before the issuance of the 
compulsory pooling order, it is  rather difficult to see just what the "joint interest" 
was. In that connection, you will recall that the statute provided that operator shall 
have the right to receive the first production which otherwise would be delivered to the 
"forced pooled owners" (here again I assume that means the same as "the other parties 
jointly interested in the drilling of the well"), to the end that the operator would be 
reimbursed out of production. At that stage we have the operator receiving all production 
attributable to the interest of the "forced pooled owner", but at the same time the "forced 
pooled owner" does have certain obligations to his lessor, one of the primary obligations 
being to pay royalty, and it follows that if the operator is to receive all production which 
otherwise would be paid to the "forced pooled owner" (and a portion thereof in turn paid 
by him to his lessor), then the forced pooled owner must satisfy his contractual royalty 
obligations out of pocket.
You will also recall that under the statute the owner desiring to take the initiative 
and drill a well upon the drilling unit was required to assume the entire risk if  any other 
owner therein, no matter how affluent he might be, decided for any reason whatsoever 
not to participate in the drilling. Of course if the well was dry or did not repay out of 
production the entire costs of drilling, then the drilling party sustained the lo ss, and
14.
if the well was successful the drilling party was only entitled to be reimbursed out of 
production for the portion of the costs which would have otherwise been borne by the 
other owner, with no increment for assuming the risk or for use of his money.
In an attempt to answer and anticipate some of the questions posed above, the 
Arkansas Legislature in 1963 enacted Act No. 563. This Act amended the prior 
statute on compulsory integration of drilling units. As so amended the statute now 
provides (1) that separately owned tracts or separately owned interests in all or part 
of an established drilling unit may be integrated; (2) that if, at the time of the effective 
date of the integration order, a well has not been completed as a commercial producer, 
all owners in the drilling unit shall have an opportunity to  participate in the drilling 
thereof but that upon the failure by any such owner to participate therein he shall transfer 
his rights in the drilling unit to the participating parties for a reasonable consideration 
and on a reasonable basis, which the Commission shall determine in the absence of 
agreement. Such transfer of right may be either a permanent transfer or may be for a 
limited period pending recoupment by the participating parties of an amount equal; to that 
which would have been borne by the non-participating party, plus an additional sum to be 
fixed by the Commission; (3) if at the tim e of the integration order a well has already 
been completed, then the non-participating party may either reimburse the drilling party 
in cash or the drilling party may receive all of the production of the non-participating 
party until the drilling party has been reimbursed an amount equal to the share of costs 
which would have been borne by the non-participating party, plus an additional sum to be 
fixed by the Commission; (4) unleased mineral interests shall be considered a royalty to 
the extent of l/8 th  of such unleased interest; (5) royalty, overriding royalty, production
15.
payments or similar interests in the drilling unit are integrated without the necessity  
of an order of compulsory integration; (6) provision is made for allocation of production 
to tracts and the distribution of the portion so allocated to the parties entitled to royalty, 
overriding royalty, e t c . , therein; and (7) all operations upon a well on any portion of 
the drilling unit shall be deemed for all purposes as if conducted upon each separately 
owned tract and interest in the drilling unit.
In the relatively short time since the enactment of that legislation, no question 
thereunder has been presented to the Arkansas Supreme Court. However, this Act, 
in the results sought to be achieved, is  sim ilar to the Oklahoma statute and the 
Oklahoma courts have had various questions before it which concern that statute. Of 
particular interest are the decisions pertaining to the sharing of costs by owners in the 
drilling unit and the participation in production therefrom. In three cases, all involving 
the same well and parties, and all styled Wood Oil Company et al v. Corporation Com-
35
m ission et al, those questions were considered. Wood Oil Company in early 1947 
completed and started producing oil from a well it drilled in accordance with appropriate 
well spacing requirements. This well, pursuant to a Commission Order (No. 19,890), 
was subsequently incorporated into a 40-acre spacing unit in which Toklan Production 
Company owned a portion of the leasehold interest, so that Toklan was entitled to 
participate in production from the well. On July 1, 1947, Toklan filed its application 
with the Commission requesting an adjudication of the respective rights of all owners 
in the unit and pursuant thereto, by order of December 2, 1947, the Commission 
issued its order (No. 20,690) requiring that Toklan pay its proportionate part of the 
costs and participate in production from date of first production. The first case , decided
16
July 18, 1950, upheld the spacing unit. The second case, decided on the same day 
as the first case, modified the order of the Commission insofar as it had granted 
Toklan the right to participate in production prior to the date that the order creating 
the spacing unit issued. Thus the case establishes the effective date of participation 
in production as the date that the order creating the spacing or drilling unit issu es  and 
not the date of the order force pooling the unit. The third case , decided December 22, 
1953, m erely affirmed certain findings of the Commission regarding participation in 
production and costs, and in so  doing established (1) that an owner who is  forced pooled 
is required to share only in actual expenditures and then only to the extent that the same 
are reasonable; (2) no interest can be charged to the forced pooled owner unless interest 
is a part of the actual expenditure and was paid; and (3) all such actual expenditures are 
to be borne by all on an acreage basis.
Another aspect of these cases was that the forced pooled owner was required 
to pay a proportionate part of the original well cost, although he was not entitled to 
participate in production therefrom for several months after its  completion.
In Anderson v . Corporation Commission and Kenneth A. Ellison, 36 decided by 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1957, the constitutionality of that portion of the Oklahoma 
statute permitting the Commission to require that a forced pooled owner either participate 
in drilling or transfer his rights was sustained. In that case the plaintiff owned approx-
imately 40% in fee in a 40-acre tract. Defendant Ellison owned a leasehold interest in 
the adjoining 40 acres, and the Commission had designated the two 40-acre tracts as a 
single drilling unit. On application of defendant Ellison the Commission entered an
17
order finding that all other owners except plaintiff in the drilling unit had agreed 
upon a plan of development of the unit and authorized defendant Ellison to drill a 
well. The order also provided that plaintiff have the option either to participate 
in the drilling of the well by paying his share of the costs, or of leasing his interest 
to defendant Ellison for $800 per acre, which the Commission found to be a reasonable 
bonus. Plaintiff contended that a cotenancy relationship existed between him self and 
Ellison by reason of the pooling and unitization order, and the order requiring him to 
participate in paying the costs or to lease to Ellison was in violation of the rights of 
co- tenants, and that the statute was unconstitutional in that it amounted to a taking of 
private property for private use and without due process of law.
The Court, in upholding the order and the validity of the statute, stated that 
consideration of the correlative rights of owners became a necessary part of statutes 
curtailing drilling, and the statute complained of was a necessary and integral part of 
securing those various rights. The Court further held that the order complained of 
did not deprive plaintiff of his property, as he was granted the right to participate in 
oil produced from another's w ell.
In Wakefield v . State of Oklahoma et al, 37 decided in 1957 by the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, the plaintiffs also asserted the co-tenancy theory but carried it a 
step forward to the end that as in all co-tenancies, the right of partition existed and 
that the partition proceeding should culminate in a forced sale. The Court stated that 
to follow that reasoning another step, instead of a "develop or sell" situation as provided 
by the statutes, there would be a "buy or sell" situation, and of course that was not 
within the scope of the statute.
18.
Another case of interest arising out of Oklahoma is Youngblood v. Seewald, 38 
decided by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in 1961. The facts of this 
case are that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission established 640-acre drilling 
units for gas for the reservoir in question. Defendant owned or otherwise had arrange-
ments for control of all but approximately 64 acres in one of these units. Plaintiff 
owned a lease on the 64-acre tract, which lease provided for a 3/16 royalty and was 
also burdened by a 1/8 of 7/8ths overriding royalty reserved by plaintiff's assignor. 
Defendant and plaintiff couldn't reach an agreement to drill a well and defendant made 
application for an order pooling the lessee  interest. The Corporation Commission 
issued its order authorizing defendant to drill and operate the unit,well, fixing the cost 
of drilling and completing the well and giving the owners of outstanding leasehold 
interests (plaintiff) one of three options, the first being to participate in the well by 
paying a proportionate part of the cost, the second being to transfer his interest for 
$50 per acre bonus, and the third being to receive an overriding royalty of 1/8 of 
8/8ths. Plaintiff elected to take an overriding royalty of 1/8 of 8/8ths. Defendant 
contended that he acquired plaintiff's leasehold interests burdened only with the usual 
l/8 th  le sso r 's  royalty and the overriding royalty of l/8 th  of 8/8ths provided for in 
the order. (Of course that would leave plaintiff holding an empty sack, since in effect 
there would be an "oversale" if defendant's position were sustained). In question was 
52 Okla. St. Ann § 8 7 .1(d) which, among other tilings, provides as follows:
"Where a lease covering any such spearately owned tract or interest 
included within a spacing unit stipulates a royalty in excess of 1/8 of
the production, or ......... shall be subject to an overriding roya lty ...........
then the lessee  of said lease out of his share of the working interest 
from the well drilled on said unit, shall sustain and pay said excess
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royalty, overriding royalty, or production payment, and therefrom  
meet any other obligation due in respect to the separately owned tract 
or interest held by h im ."
Defendant contended that the effect of that statute is  that when one designated to drill 
the well on a drilling unit acquires the working interest on other leases within the unit 
by virtue of the pooling order, the owner of excess or overriding royalty in those leases  
must look to the person who owned the leases just prior to the pooling order for payment 
of their royalties.
The Court, in overruling defendant’s contention, was undoubtedly, influenced 
by plaintiff’s predicament in that he would have been excluded from participating in 
the production as a working interest owner, and still the share he had elected to receive  
would be insufficient to satisfy the remaining overriding burdens. Under those conditions 
the Court had no difficulty in determining that the statute does not specify whether the 
" lessee  of the lease” should be determined before or after the pooling order and that 
the Commission did not undertake to disturb the excess royalty or the prior overriding 
royalty and those burdens, in addition to the 1/8 of the 8/8ths pooling order overriding 
royalty must be satisfied by defendant, who is  now the ’’le s s e e ” referred to in the statute.
While I have no quarrel with the Court’s conclusion, it would seem that room 
for chicanery and manipulation now exists under this and sim ilar statutes. For instance, 
the owner of an unleased mineral interest in lands comprising a spacing unit which in all 
probability will be drilled, can execute a 1/4 or 1/2 royalty lease  to his son or brother, 
e tc ., or the owner of a lease under the above circumstances could assign to a friendly 
third party and reserve a substantial override -  the result would either be a free ride 
for all time or non-development.
20.
Even though the Arkansas Supreme Court was not called upon to decide upon 
the constitutionality of our old law on compulsory pooling or any matters arising 
thereunder in the twenty-three years of its  existence, and even though the new law 
was designed to answer many of the questions and eliminate many of the apparent 
shortcomings of the old law, it would appear that the subject of compulsory integration 
rem ains a fertile field for litigation, and I would suspect that in the not too distant 
future we w ill be privileged in hearing some leading authority discuss the latest 
cases under the Arkansas compulsory unitization law.
21.
